consumer prices-long before Wal-Mart became infamous for said strategy.
1 Trucks, I contend, were political technologies, used to define the contours of public policy regarding foods and farmers; at the same time, trucks as technologies shaped the economic and social structures underlying those political debates. In doing so, long-haul trucking in the rural countryside set the pace for the lowprice, low-wage, "free-market" economic ideologies of late twentiethcentury American capitalism. Originally, I had not expected this dissertation to deal with such heady issues of political economy. In fact, I started out with two questions that at first seemed to have little to do with business or economics. The first question emerged from my interest-both academic and recreational-in country music. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, country musicians and record labels released dozens of songs about "Looking at the World through a Windshield" while spending "Six Days on the Road" as an "Asphalt Cowboy." Trucking songs, I noticed, are almost always country songs. Why, I wondered? Was there something specifically "country" about trucking as a way of life, as a metaphor, as a technology?
The second question emerged from personal experience. Growing up on a dairy farm in rural Wisconsin, I knew almost as many truck drivers as I knew farmers. Many of the truckers I knew hauled farm products-hogs, cattle, fertilizers, grain, milk, and so on-although many also hauled manufactured goods such as processed foods. This seemed to make sense, because farmers need to get their products to market, and food processors turn those products into finished goods. But I also thought there might be more, because all these truckers had begun driving at a time when the business of farming had become so tenuous that everyone I knew was either selling their farm and getting a steadier job, or buying someone else's farm in an effort to stay competitive. Besides, trucking was a job that allowed for a chance to be one's own man-much like farming was imagined to be. So I began to wonder if there were larger structural forces at play, making trucking "country" akin to farming in a cultural sense, even as farming became more and more businesslike?
I set out to see if this might lead anywhere. First I had to explain why farmers were shipping products by truck rather than rail. The Midwestern farms I grew up on and around, after all, were created by railroads, not highways. 2 Other scholars have argued that trucks replaced trains in the mid-twentieth century as America's primary mode of general transportation because the U.S. government played favorites. Truckers received low-cost infrastructure through the construction of highways, according to the standard interpretation, and also benefited from an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that favored trucking firms while tightening regulation of the railroads.
3 Neither of these explanations seemed convincing, however. Even with heavily subsidized infrastructure, it has almost always been more expensive to ship by truck than by rail except for very short hauls. And in terms of regulation, from 1935 to 1980 most of the freight-trucking industry was just as tightly regulated as the railroads. And although the ICC did treat certain trucking firms favorably, they did so in ways that encouraged cartelization in trucking-hardly a recipe for lowering transportation costs. 4 So, if not lower costs, what did trucking offer to shippers? The answer, it seemed, was flexibility. Trains are tied to steel rails, but trucks can travel anywhere a road leads. A trucker can thus haul directly from point to point, from loading dock to unloading dockallowing for speedier service and just-in-time deliveries that might well justify, for some businesses, the higher costs of shipping by truck.
But the more I thought through this issue of flexibility, the more I realized I was on to something even bigger. After digging through various government archives and published legislative, judicial, and executive documents; business records and industry trade journals; and the written and spoken words of truckers, I began to realize that to answer my questions about the culture and social structures of rural life in relation to trucking, I had to do some heavy lifting in the realm of political economy. What made trucking "country," I was beginning to see, was fundamentally a function of the forms of industrial capitalism that emerged in the American countryside in the mid-twentieth century. Trucking's "flexibility," I came to find, was not just a product of inherent technological advantages over rail transport but was shaped by the political, economic, and social structures of industrial agriculture and rural life.
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I discovered early in my research that the act that initiated federal economic regulation of the trucking industry-the 1935 Motor Carrier Act-had a curious clause. This clause exempted from regulation all truckers hauling "agricultural commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)."
6 This exemption was important, because after 1935, the ICC implemented cartelizing regulations upon the general freight-trucking industry, seeking to maintain industry stability by limiting competition and stabilizing freight rates. The impact of these regulations on the general trucking industry was twofold: regulation led to increasing economic concentration in trucking, and just as importantly, removed any incentives firms might have had to resist the Teamsters Union. In short, regulation limited competition in the trucking freight market and in the trucking labor market. 7 But because haulers who carried "agricultural commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)" were exempt from these regulations, the opposite occurred: agricultural trucking was, during the entire period of ICC regulation, characterized by atomized, very small, nonunionized firms, most often located in rural areas. Many of these firms were owned by the drivers themselves-truckers who called themselves "owner-operators" and were called "independents" by moviemakers and admiring journalists but were scorned as "gypsies" or "wildcatters" by the Teamsters Union. 100,000 of the nation's 500,000 long-haul truckers were owneroperators, of whom more than 80 percent did not belong to any union. 8 The fact that agricultural trucking was not as tightly regulated as general freight trucking offered a partial answer to one of my original research questions-that is, regulatory structures seemed to have created a "parallel economy" for agricultural highway transportation, an economy devoid of large firms and inherently hostile to the Teamsters Union. This seemed at least partly responsible for encouraging the rise of the fiercely "independent" truck driving man in rural America and for providing grist for the country music industry looking for a new working-class hero to replace the dirt farmer and the train engineer-both of whom were rapidly disappearing from the rural landscape in the mid-twentieth century.
But what economic purpose did the agricultural exemption within the 1935 Motor Carrier Act serve? Originally, it was proposed by Congressional farm bloc members who wanted to allow farmers with small trucks to haul a few cattle or some milk cans to market without needing ICC authority. After all, a farmer hauling his own products to market would not pose much competition to an established freight trucker like Jack Keeshin (an early proponent of federal regulation whose Chicago trucking firm already had 250 machines as early as 1932-well before improved highways made long-haul trucking a viable big business).
9 And in fact, truckers who fell under the agricultural exemption clause of the Motor Carrier Act never did pose much of a threat to the big regulated freight carriers. The big carriers invested in nationwide networks of warehouses and freight terminals to achieve economies of scale in delivering goods across the nation. Independent owner-operators hauling a load of cattle or potatoes were not in the same league as common carrier firms such as Roadway. 10 But the unregulated haulers of agricultural commodities did not need infrastructure, because they had flexibility: they could travel anywhere, deliver goods point-to-point, and do so without paying themselves union-scale wages. And this was the key: this flexibility of trucking, I argue, was used by certain firms to radically transform the economic geography of industrial agriculture, achieving unprecedented power to dictate the terms of pricing in both the farm and food economies. Three chapters of the dissertation trace in detail the dairy, beef, and frozen food industries as they turned away from railroad shipping and toward truck transport. In each case, trucks and highways made it possible for firms to decentralize operations by moving deeper into the countryside to be closer to their sources of supply and to lower-wage rural workforces. In each case, firms relied on exempt agricultural truckers to provide extremely flexible service, allowing for rapid shifts in business operations to respond in real time to the inherent unpredictability of farming (with its seasonality and climate and weather dependence). In each case, agribusiness firms were able to provide low-cost "convenience" foods to American consumers while keeping farm prices steady-thus neatly taming the political contentiousness of the decades-old "farm problem."
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In the beef industry, for example, long-haul trucking helped upstart firms such as IBP and Excel to build a new monopoly rivaling that of Swift and Armour, nearly a century before. The Big Four meatpackers, despite nagging antitrust concerns that gave them the public moniker "the Beef Trust," had paid good wages to large, unionized workforces in the urban Midwest since the union drives of the 1930s. 12 In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the new breed of upstart meatpackers relied on highways and "asphalt cowboys" to vacate factories built in nineteenth-century railroad cities like Chicago and St. Louis. In the "Old West" cowboy country of Kansas, Colorado, and Texarhoma, the meatpackers built a new Westreplete with industrially fed steers and hyper-efficient slaughterhouses staffed by nonunion rural and immigrant workers.
13 By the early 1970s, a few of these upstart packers had constructed a beef empire that would have surprised even Upton Sinclair. Despite the reconstruction of a meatpacking "Jungle," the new beef industry satisfied consumer demands for cheap beef while flouting government antitrust laws. Long-haul trucking offered a different sort of political power to milk dealers, another case study in the dissertation. Milk bottlers, like the big meatpackers, had long come under attack for abusing their monopoly power to drive up the price of "nature's perfect food."
14 Unlike the "Beef Trust," however, milk dealers and large dairy farmers had cultivated tight relationships with friendly government administrators since the onset of the New Deal. But in the 1950s and 1960s, milk bottlers sought to break their dependence on the heavy hand of government regulation. Ironically, this turn to "free enterprise" occurred even as milk dealers increasingly relied on government-funded research into trucking technology-research explicitly encouraged by Eisenhower's secretary of agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, a virulent anti-New Dealer. Milk bottlers began relying on independent nonunionized milk hauling truckers to gather milk in enormous refrigerated tanks from industrialized dairy farms organized into "super co-ops." Long-haul truckers also began transporting cartons of milk directly to supermarkets, bypassing the doorstep bottle delivery system that for decades had paid good wages to Teamster milkmen. Teamsters and small farmers-whose insistence on a "fair price" for milk had long drained the profits of organized commercial dairymen and milk dealers-publicly protested the highly monopolistic "free-market" milk economy that emerged in the 1960s. Their efforts to blockade supermarket aisles and dump milk on the side of highways, though, gained little sympathy from consumers accustomed to low-priced jugs of milk. Perhaps ironically, this same "free-market" ideology was embraced not only by agribusinesses and by food consumers but also by the "independent" truckers upon whose backs the industrial machinery of the modern food economy rode. As the industrial marketing machinery of the new food economy spread through the countryside-with the number of farms decreasing even as farms grew larger in size-farmers were often forced to see off-farm work as more attractive than staying on the land. Trucks made the marketing machine function, so there were plenty of them to drive, and driving big rigs came readily to rural men accustomed to long hours and cantankerous machinery. Furthermore, the increasingly industrial nature of the postwar rural economy encouraged a new kind of identity that combined rural values with working-class sensibilities. Nowhere was this more evident than in the stream of country songs about truckers that hit the airwaves in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Especially after the success of Dave Dudley's "Six Days on the Road," Nashville record producers realized that an important market existed for songs that maintained a "country" aesthetic but dealt lyrically with the reality of industrial labor. The masculine ideals of the "asphalt cowboy" and "king of the open road" surrounding trucking served as a particularly effective symbol for songwriters and producers looking to identify this market segment.
Importantly, that symbolism fed into an abortive neopopulist political movement in the 1970s, as truck drivers who imagined themselves to be the inheritors of the agrarian mythology of "independent" farming found their independence challenged. In 1961, an ex-trucker named Mike Parkhurst established Overdrive magazinethe "Voice of the American Trucker." In February 1962, Parkhurst declared himself a "radical conservative" and issued a manifesto for the independent truckers of the world: "Today, the small businessman is being swallowed up by the big businessman . . . . Yet For Mike Parkhurst, deregulation would free the enslaved trucker and undermine what he saw as a corrupt Teamsters Union. Deregulation would transform freight trucking into an industry of small, decentralized firms relying on owner-operator drivers-just like agricultural trucking had been since the 1930s. With the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Parkhurst saw his wish come true. Not all truckers were pleased with the result; one driver penned a 1983 New York Times editorial claiming that deregulation brought chaotic and cut-throat competition, creating "more gypsies than the market can bear."
18 By 1996, the nation's freight bill reached an all-time low, but at the cost of transforming big rigs into "sweatshops on wheels," as firms slashed wages while Teamster power collapsed in long-haul trucking. 19 Other scholars have seen trucking deregulation in the
